Introduction

This paper explores the nature and extent of Chinese migrants’ involvement in the demand and supply of non-traditional agricultural commodities in Ethiopia, shares the perspectives of the different actors involved, and discusses the implications of this presence for Ethiopian development. The focus here is not simply on the food and agriculture sector; the study also aims to shed light on the Chinese migrants involved in that sector. For instance, who are they and where do they come from in China? Why do they come to Ethiopia, and how do they end up in the food and agriculture sector? How do their business networks operate? What are their aspirations, and do they see Ethiopia as a permanent home?

Currently Chinese engagement in the food and agriculture sector in Ethiopia is occurring at multiple levels. At the level of official cooperation between the two states, there is a China-Ethiopia Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre (ATDC) in Ginchi; Chinese instructors are teaching at agricultural vocational colleges; Chinese agronomists are participating in UN and other agricultural development projects; and Chinese experts are serving with the Ministry of Agriculture (Alemu 2013). However, Chinese engagement in the food and agriculture sector in Ethiopia and in other African countries is by no means confined to the level of official cooperation. Chinese entrepreneurs are also investing in farms and food sector businesses. Meanwhile, the presence of large numbers of Chinese migrants has spurred demand for non-traditional agricultural commodities such as pork, tofu and Chinese vegetables, with Chinese entrepreneurs engaged in the sale and in some cases also in the production of these commodities. Non-traditional agricultural commodities are defined here as those food commodities which are not a part of the traditional Ethiopian diet. Examples include pork, tofu, sesame and certain types of vegetables such as bok choy, chives and Chinese cabbage (see Annex 1). This study focuses on non-traditional commodities because Chinese migrants prefer them to traditional Ethiopian foods, and this niche market has grown in tandem with the Chinese presence in the country.

This is a story which is unfolding largely below the radar of official cooperation, based on exchanges between Ethiopian producers and merchants on the one hand with Chinese consumers and entrepreneurs on the other. Neither the Ethiopian nor the Chinese governments appear to be significantly involved in promoting this trade. Rather than being a state orchestrated phenomenon, it has arisen organically in tandem with the growing Chinese presence in the country. Thus this study provides insights into China-Africa relations that have emerged not from state sponsored programmes, but more through informal migration, enterprise and

commercial/farming relationships. Is it possible that these relations are more important, and greater in reach and depth, than the formal cooperation? As French (2014) observes,

In time, the behaviour of these newcomers, the relationships they form with Africans, the way they conduct their business, their respect or lack thereof for the law, for local customs, for the environment, and, above all, for people, will do more to determine China’s image, and perhaps even China’s broad relationship to the continent, than any carefully planned actions by the Beijing government to build state power and reinforce national prestige. (French 2014: 6)

Chinese migration to Ethiopia has increased significantly in recent years as Chinese companies have expanded their presence in the construction, road building, hydropower, electricity, railroad, telecommunications, manufacturing and other sectors. Estimates of the number of Chinese in Ethiopia vary widely. A source in the Ethiopian Embassy in Beijing told one of the authors that there are 35,000- 40,000 Chinese people living in Ethiopia.1 A contact in the Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa put that number at 20,000.2 Of course, one has to keep in mind that many Chinese move back and forth frequently between the two countries, and accurate figures on the Chinese presence in Ethiopia are difficult to obtain and constantly in flux.

While there is clearly a substantial Chinese presence in Ethiopia, our research indicates that few Chinese are directly engaged in agricultural production. This is not due to legal or regulatory restrictions on farming by foreign individuals or corporations. Rather, Chinese involvement is limited by other factors such as the low profitability of agriculture compared to other branches of the food industry like restaurants and retail shops. Furthermore, local entrepreneurs are already producing sufficient quantities of some non-traditional commodities such as Chinese vegetables to meet market demand. An additional factor may be legal restrictions on foreigners in retail sales, which in turn prevents the kind of vertical integration of food businesses that is evident among Ethiopian entrepreneurs, and which is possible in other African countries. In fact, one of the salient findings of this study is that it is mostly local people producing non-traditional agricultural commodities for sale to Chinese customers in Ethiopia.

At least so far, the Chinese presence in the Ethiopian food and farming sector is dominated by independent entrepreneurs rather than large companies. Many were originally attached to large companies,3 and later branched out on their own once they became aware of the plentiful opportunities to do business in Ethiopia. As one former truck driver from Jilin put it, ‘China doesn’t have many blank spaces, whereas here there are many’. What he meant was that virtually every business opportunity has already been exploited in China, whereas there are ample untapped opportunities waiting to be developed in Ethiopia. It is this combination of increased demand and promising business opportunities, coupled with entrepreneurial initiative on the part of Ethiopians and Chinese, that has resulted in the growth of food sector businesses to deliver non-traditional commodities.

This study traces the engagement of Chinese migrants in the supply and demand of three non-traditional commodities: pork, tofu and Chinese vegetables. Following a brief overview of relevant literature and methodology used in the study, we first examine the Chinese presence in each of these commodity chains, then go on to discuss the involvement of Chinese migrants in farms and restaurants. Later sections of the paper explore migrant networks, the opportunities that draw migrants to Ethiopia and interactions with the Chinese Embassy. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the Chinese presence in the food and agriculture sector for Ethiopian development.

Literature and research methods

There is a substantial literature on foreign investment in Ethiopian agriculture (e.g., Davison 2014; Mosley 2012; FAO 2011; Lavers 2011; Makki and Geisler 2011; Oakland Institute 2011) and considerable attention to the issue of ‘land grabs’ in the country. However, the literature on Chinese investment in Ethiopian agriculture is sparse. As Bräutigam and Tang (2012: v) point out, this reflects the fact that the recent growth of China’s investment in Africa is neither well documented nor well understood. Bräutigam and Tang provide an overview of China’s engagement in Ethiopian agriculture and rural areas in historical perspective, tracing the evolution of foreign aid and investment by Chinese companies in the period between 1970 and 2011. They conclude that while China has long been engaged with Ethiopian agriculture and rural development, Chinese agricultural investment is not nearly as large as is generally believed.

Although Chinese investment in the agricultural sector in Ethiopia is limited, there is substantial technical cooperation between the two countries in agriculture, focusing on the transfer of agricultural technology and knowledge through training and demonstration. Current cooperation is based on the economic and technological cooperation agreements signed in 2006 and amended in 2007, which has resulted in: (i) an agreement to construct an Ethiopia-China Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre in Ethiopia; and (ii) an agreement for the provision of Chinese instructors in agricultural technical vocational education and training (TVET) to Ethiopia (Alemu 2013).

While much is occurring at the official bilateral level in terms of agricultural cooperation between China and Ethiopia, this is clearly only part of the story. Delving beyond this level requires an ethnographic approach,

locating and engaging with Chinese companies, entrepreneurs and farmers to ascertain their motivations, aspirations and experiences in the country. In this regard, we are following in the path of other researchers tracing the story of Chinese migrants in Africa (e.g., French 2014; Guo Chatelard and Chu 2014; Mohan et al. 2014; Park 2012; 2009; Ho 2008; Dobler 2005; Ong 1993).

Two recent books are notable for their comprehensive and balanced approach to the study of Chinese migrants in Africa, and served as benchmarks against which to compare our findings in Ethiopia. Mohan et al. (2014) use case studies and surveys from four countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Angola) to illuminate the motivations, relationships and impacts of the most recent wave of Chinese migrants in Africa. The authors note that much of the discussion of China-Africa relations and the presence of Chinese migrants in Africa has been characterised by ‘oppositional discourses’ – such as the notion that the presence of Chinese people and companies is either a resoundingly negative phenomenon, or something that is markedly positive. The authors argue (Ibid: 3) that these polarised debates tend to ‘reflect ideological standpoints as opposed to a focused engagement with reality’, which is far more complex, and many of their findings resonate with those of this study.

French (2014) takes a more critical perspective on the Chinese presence – particularly the power asymmetries between Chinese and African actors – than does the previous book, but is no less nuanced or insightful. Like this study, his principal focus is on Chinese migrants rather than official cooperation, noting that‘history teaches us that very often reality is more meaningfully shaped by the deeds of countless smaller actors, most of them for all intents and purposes anonymous. In this vein, each of China’s new immigrants to Africa is an architect helping to shape this momentous new relationship’ (Ibid: 5).

To date there have only been a few studies focusing specifically on Chinese migrants in the food and agriculture sector of African countries. A notable example is Guo Chatelard and Chu (2014), which examines Chinese agricultural engagements in Zambia, with a particular focus on individual, private entrepreneurs rather than state sponsored investments. While this paper deals exclusively with farms and not food sector businesses, Zambia provides an interesting case to compare with Ethiopia, particularly given the larger number of Chinese farmers there. Another study of Zambia is Yan and Sautman’s (2010), which traces the evolution of Chinese participation in Zambian agriculture from‘agro-socialist’ to‘agro-capitalist’modes, and includes some information on Chinese commercial farmers. In spite of the greater Chinese agricultural presence in Zambia than in Ethiopia, both articles conclude that Chinese farmers are only minor players in commercial agriculture in Zambia.

Just as there is a dearth of information on Chinese migrants, there is a lack of reliable data on the production and consumption of non-traditional commodities such as pork and vegetables in Ethiopia. Data on Chinese investment in the agricultural sector is also incomplete and often inaccurate. For instance, spreadsheets obtained from the Ethiopian Investment Agency in March 2014 list 41 Chinese investments in the agricultural sector in the period between October 1995 and November 2014, out of a total of 853 foreign agricultural investments. However, most of the phone numbers and email addresses of the contacts for these investments are no longer valid, so their existence was impossible to confirm. Visits to the locations of some of these notional investments showed nothing on the ground. According to several informants we interviewed, many of these investments exist only on paper. Our attempts to contact the Chinese investors listed in these spreadsheets by phone and email only uncovered two commercially operating farms: the Joy River Meat Company located in Butajira, about 130km from Addis Ababa, and a 10ha vegetable farm located about 60km outside of the capital. On the other hand, we did find several Chinese companies with plans to invest in agriculture. Overall, there appear to be very few actual Chinese farms in Ethiopia. These findings are consistent with Bräutigam and Tang (2012), who found only one such case,4 despite a significant record of Chinese engagement in agriculture and rural development in the country since official diplomatic relations between the two nations began in 1970.

This research was conducted by one American researcher fluent in Chinese and one Ethiopian researcher fluent in English and Amharic. Several other Ethiopian researchers provided assistance in trying to locate Chinese investments on the ground, and in gathering information. We attempted to locate Chinese farmers and migrants involved in other parts of the food industry by triangulating between Investment Agency lists, regional tours conducted by local research assistants and ad hoc investigations, based on snowball sampling. In Addis Ababa, much of this research was conducted in the Rwanda Market, which is the main place where Chinese and other Asian migrants go to buy meat and vegetables. Chinese restaurants were also important places for gathering data and making contacts. Other sites visited included the ATDC in Ginchi; Alage Agicultural College; and Hawasa, where Chinese agricultural experts are involved in a project of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Several Ethiopian research assistants also visited other locations in the country where Chinese agricultural investments were supposed to be located, and found no evidence of these investments on the ground.

The main methodologies used in the study were structured and semi-structured interviews together with participant observation. We conducted a total of 45 interviews, of which 43 were done during four visits to Ethiopia between November 2013 and December 2014, and another two interviews with informants based in China. In addition to these longer interviews, there were also a much larger number of shorter interactions with

Chinese and Ethiopians involved in the production and consumption of non-traditional commodities. Informants included officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, staff of the ATDC, instructors at Alage Agricultural College, hotel managers, restaurant owners, entrepreneurs, local vegetable and meat vendors and researchers at the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (see Annex 2 for a full list of interviewees). Interviews were conducted in Chinese, English and Amharic depending on the preference of the informant and ease of communication.

This study underscores the importance of multi- national research teams in examining subject matter of this kind. Collecting certain kinds of official data such as investment statistics; engaging with delalas5 and local vegetable vendors; and making visits to Ethiopian farms all required local connections and language skills that only an Ethiopian researcher such as the co-author of this paper could supply. On the other hand, engaging with Chinese informants in the restaurant, retail and farming sectors could only be done by a Chinese speaker. As a Chinese speaking American, the co-author of this paper was immediately able to engage with Chinese informants, and being a non-Chinese was actually helpful as it aroused curiosity and in some cases made Chinese people willing to talk and provide information. Where both Chinese and Ethiopian informants were present, we were able to piece together conversations and probe cross-cultural interactions that would have remained inaccessible had we been working individually. On the other hand, it was difficult for us to get access to the Chinese Embassy or other Chinese officials, who could be more easily approached by Chinese colleagues. There were also cases where Chinese informants such as tofu producers were unwilling to interact with us, for reasons that we were never able to ascertain.

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